Punishment, Proportionality, and the Economic Analysis of Crime by DRAPER, A
UCL Bentham Project
Journal of Bentham Studies, vol. 11 (2009)
1
Punishment, Proportionality, and the Economic Analysis of
Crime
ANTHONY J. DRAPER
School of Public Policy, University College London
Since Gary Becker’s ground-breaking intervention in 1968 economists have come to
regard crime and punishment not only as a legitimate area of interest for economic
analysis, but also an especially important one.1 As Becker himself acknowledged, much
contemporary economic analysis of these broad social issues draws on the foundational
work undertaken by the consequentialist political theorists of the eighteenth century,
and on the ideas of Jeremy Bentham and Cesare Beccaria in particular.2 Becker saw his
role as updating the thinking of these theorists, and of re-emphasising the relevance of
their analysis for twentieth-century economic theory. The analysis pursued here seeks
to underline Becker’s observations on the validity of these earlier enquiries and aims to
offer further details on the development of those eighteenth-century lines of enquiry
which are proving so useful in more recent considerations of the economic
perspectives on crime and punishment.
The emphasis here will be on Bentham’s discussion of punishment as optimal
policy in response to offending behaviour. Four key themes will be explored. First,
the range of Bentham’s conception of an ‘economic’ approach to punishment will be
explored, and the relationship of his penal theory to his broader understanding of
political economy will be examined. Second, the cost-benefit approach to punishment
1 G. S. Becker, ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’, Journal of Political Economy, lxxvi.
(1968), pp. 169-217.
2 Of Bentham’s works, texts derived from Dumont’s Traités de législation civile et pénale, ed. É.
Dumont, 3 vols., Paris, 1802, have usually been the source for Bentham’s views on crime and
punishment. This discussion draws primarily on Bentham’s An Introduction to the Principles of Morals
and Legislation, London, 1789; the version used being An Introduction to the Principles of Morals
and Legislation, ed. J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart, London, 1970, and published as part of The
Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham , hereafter IPML (CW). Other valuable works dealing with
Bentham’s penal theory included: Théorie des peines et des récompenses , ed. É. Dumont, 2 vols.,
London, 1811; The Rationale of Punishment , ed. R. Smith, London, 1830; ‘Principles of Penal Law’,
in The Works of Jeremy Bentham , ed. J. Bowring, 11 vols., Edinburgh, 1838-43,, i. pp. 336-580
(hereafter ‘Bowring’).
Cesare Beccaria was a young Lombardian aristocrat who rose to prominence with the publication of
Dei delitti e delle pene , Leghorn, false imprint Haarlem, 1764. Hereafter, references are to On Crimes
and Punishments, trans. D. Young, Indianapolis, 1986. A rearranged French translation was produced by
Morellet in 1766, and an English edition published in 1767.
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grew clearly from an established tradition of consequentialist thinking and the
context and influences on Bentham’s own utilitarian brand of economic analysis will
be identified. Third, the question of leniency in punishment is intrinsically connected
to Bentham’s analysis of the nature of offences and this focus for his theory will be
examined, and significant distinctions illustrated between the consequentialist theories
of Bentham and Beccaria. Finally, Bentham’s analysis involved a sophisticated notion
of ‘economy’ that allowed his calculative model to accommodate an account of the
‘disposition’ of an offender in the assigning of pain of punishment. This previously
undiscussed element of his theory will be explored in some detail, and will be used to
answer some significant criticisms of Bentham’s ‘economic’ approach to
punishment.3
These four themes combine to form a consistent focus on Bentham’s primary
concern, that a reduction in the levels of pain applied was not only required, but
was essential, if improved efficiency in the deterrent force of punishment, and hence
an advance in political economy, was to be achieved by judicial practice.4
1. Political Economy and the ‘Economic’ Conception of Punishment
Consequentialist logic lies at the heart of Bentham’s economic analysis of crime and
punishment. Such methodology presents any act, and any legislative act in particular,
as being ‘right’ in so far as it provides, or promises to provide, a surfeit of happiness.
Such ‘happiness’ can be understood either in conventional ‘economic’ terms as a
monetary value, and this is appropriate for Bentham in many of his writings which
considered specific financial issues. But, in relation to punishment, Bentham’s
discussion interprets ‘economic’ much more widely in his discussions of ‘quantities’
of pain and pleasure. For example, Bentham used very broad terms, such as
‘mischief’ for negatives in the cost-benefit equation – which covered everything
from financial loss to fear and danger offered by the threat of offending. These general
expressions allowed him to extend and apply his calculative analysis across a strikingly
3 These criticisms can be found in É. Halévy, La formation du Radicalism Philosophique , 3 vols., Paris 1901-
4, trans. M. Morris as The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism , London, 1928; rept. 1972, pp. 69-72; and L.
Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Law and its Administration from 1750, 5 vols., London,
1948-86, pp. 381-5, and pp. 391-3, ‘Emphasis on Severity’.
4 Evidence from the Bentham archive at University College London will be of importance here. For
Bentham’s interest in leniency see UC xxvii. 48; for a discussion on precise calculation as an aid to
deterrence see UC xxvii. 24a; and on the need for judicial interpretation see UC cxl. 61.
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broad range of economic, social and political issues. So, whilst monetary value was
frequently the explicit concern of his thinking, it is constantly apparent that via his
reductionist principles the ultimate measure underpinning his ‘economic’ perspective of
social and political questions always remained pain and pleasure in the broadest sense.
For Bentham, social, political and economic perspectives were inextricably
linked, and the symbiotic inevitability of subject approaches is clearly identified in his
conception of the close relationship between penal theory and political economy.
Political economy was integrally connected to his complete code of laws5 and formed,
for Bentham, ‘[...] an art exercisible by those who have government of the nation in
their hands, [...] the art of directing the national industry to the purposes to which it
may be directed with the greatest advantage’.6 Such ‘greatest advantage’ can clearly
be understood in standard economic terms with profits, outputs and standards of
living forming the bases of assessment. Taking the broader conception prevalent in
Bentham’s thought, however, ‘greatest advantage’ can also be considered in terms of
happiness of the national community, which focuses on something other than
conventional economic growth. Bentham is thinking here of the peace of mind
brought to individuals by a sense of economic ‘security’. His penal policy is wholly
commensurate with this since he supposed that, ‘the most powerful means of
augmenting national wealth are those which maintain the security of properties [...]
Such are the objects of [...] penal law’.7 Penal law is here linked explicitly with political
economy; and whilst Bentham appreciated that political economy may be seen as ‘[...]
a science distinct from every other’ he also went on to claim that,
[...] I do not see that there can exist a code of laws concerning
political economy, distinct and separate from all the other codes. The
collection of laws upon this subject would only be a mass of imperfect
shreds, drawn without distinction from the whole body of laws.
Political economy, for example, has reference to the penal laws,
5 See ‘A General View of a Complete Code of Laws’, in Bowring, Works, iii, pp. 155-210, Ch. xxvii, ‘Of
Political Economy’, where he says: ‘The distinction marked by the word economy is applicable rather to a
branch of the science of legislation, than to a division in a code of laws. It is much easier to say what
branch of this science should be called political economy, than to say what laws are economical.’
6 ‘Manual of Political Economy’ in Jeremy Bentham’s Economic Writings, ed. W. Stark, 3 vols,
London, 1952, i. p. 223.
7 ‘A General View of a Complete Code of Laws’, Bowring, iii. pp. 203. He also regards the civil law
as assisting in terms of aiding the establishment of ‘equality’. Both civil and penal aspects of his
conception of political economy are important, though only the penal will be considered here.
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which create the species of offences which have been called offences
against population, and offences against the national wealth.8
This view links the pursuit of national ‘wealth’ with his discussion of
offences in chapter sixteen of IPML, and a case is made for all issues of political
economy to be regarded as dependent on the security provided by the penal system.
Relying ultimately on the notion that security is the key to progress for national
industry Bentham regarded the deterrent and reformative goal of punishment as
essential to any co-ordination of economic growth undertaken by central authorities.
Accordingly, the provision of a deterrent system of punishment was intrinsically
linked, in Bentham’s view, to a calculative emphasis on the nature of both
individual motivation and the central questions of political economy.
Quantification was key to both his general and specific pictures of deterrence and
the motivation to offend. With this economically inclined focus at the core of
Bentham’s penal theory, the constant source of his interest in terms of achieving an
effective penal theory centres on the role of ‘quantities’ of legal pain applied in
response to the harm done and benefit gained by an offence. The question of
proportionality in the amount of pain inflicted as legal punishment is, therefore,
fundamental to Bentham’s penal theory and essential to his consideration of political
economy.
Bentham’s analysis of proportionality is comprehensive and seeks to identify not
only when it is right to punish offending behaviour, but also at what level any penal
intervention should take. His detailed analysis of the notional link between the
harms and benefits of crime, the harms and benefits of punishment, and an
explanation of how this ‘economic analysis’ was to operate when applied to questions
of social policy embodies the foundational critique that so inspired Becker. By
examining Bentham’s discussion of proportionality as presented in IPML it is clear
that Bentham was even more radical than Becker supposed. Bentham was perfectly
able to understand how crime9 could be effectively subjected to economic analysis,
and he developed a radical vision of the choices made by offenders, or ‘criminals’, as
being valid from their own perspective, and necessarily accounted for, even justified,
by their own unique set of circumstances and sensibilities.
8 Ibid.
9 ‘Crime’ meaning all offending behaviour prescribed by law.
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Bentham’s account identified, more clearly than ever before, that crime is
beneficial as well as harmful, and that legal punishment is harmful as well as
beneficial. The core conceptions of costs and benefits expressed within his economic
conception of crime and punishment can be represented, in simplified form, as follows:
Crime and Punishment Cost-Benefit Table
Cost Benefit
In respect of individuals:
1a ‘Danger’ and ‘alarm’ of punishment
threatened for potential offenders
Versus Potential illegal gains to be received
by the offender
1b Restraint from illegal acts and
absence of benefits of offending for
non-offender
Versus Guaranteed avoidance of legal
punishments for non-offenders
In respect of society as a whole:
2a General secondary pain of punishment
– ‘alarm’ and ‘danger’
Versus General deterrence, reformation,
producing prevention of future
offending
2b General primary pain of punishment
to offender, offender’s dependents,
relatives and acquaintances
Versus Particular deterrence, reformation
and incapacitation from future
offending
From Bentham’s description of political economy and his economic approach to
punishment it can be seen that benefit 2a, that of general deterrence, must take
precedence from the policy perspective since this promises greatest advantage for
society at large. Yet the impact of policy on the individual is essential to Bentham’s
approach, and could never be over-ridden by his interest in, and requirement for,
general deterrence. In this sense benefit 1 b, that of protecting ‘non-offenders’ from
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the danger of suffering punishment, was a key requirement, for this benefit adds
materially to the sense of security required for progress in political economy, and it
must act alongside any relief of 1a, the threat of becoming a victim of crime. Benefit
1a, shows how far Bentham went with his reductive consequentialism, since here
illegal gains are identified as benefits – they may act against good political economy,
but they are still goods for the individuals receiving them and will continue to occur
so long as the future benefits of offending ‘appear’ to outweigh the threat of future pain.
Delicate balancing is therefore required in the assignment of pain of punishment,
which is an evil, as a response to offending behaviour. Punishment is, then, a cost
operating as a political tool, assisting in the process of selective restraint (it is simply
not economically ‘worth’ trying to prevent all crime – this is clearly understood by
Bentham’s ends of punishment.10
The problem for Bentham is how to secure the promotion of benefits 2a, 1 a and
2b without the harms imposed by the penal threat becoming excessive in terms of
the implications for individuals? This concern for excess illustrates the emphasis
placed on restraint in the application of legal pain, and provides a foundation for
‘lenience’ in punishment on an economic model. Lenience is a term frequently
discussed by penal theorists of the late eighteenth century, but the term ‘leniency’
carried the wrong connotations for Bentham, since if the correct proportions are
applied then the pain of punishment will be neither too lenient nor too severe, but
‘just’. Proportionality is the key notion.
Proportionality had always been, of course, a core component of European
penal theory and the idea that punishment embodied a ‘just’ desert for a crime
committed had long been linked to the conception of a controlled and fair response to
offending. Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries this notion of an
optimal balance in the public response to crime took centre stage for the
consequentialist theories of Beccaria and Bentham, as well as for the revival in
retributivist theory displayed most prominently in the works of Immanuel Kant and
Georg Hegel. But retributivist thinking re-emerged, in many ways, in response to the
strength of the consequentialist critique and a primary question must be – from where
did Bentham and Beccaria derive their consequentialist interest in proportionality? To
answer this it is necessary to look in greater detail at the intellectual context out of
10 See IPML (CW), p. 158.
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which their ideas developed.
2. The Background to Bentham on Proportion
Bentham’s development of the idea of proportion between crimes and punishments
shows considerable reliance and interaction with the work of earlier thinkers. In
some respects he can be described as imposing an order on concepts previously
introduced by Montesquieu and Beccaria - and also, to a degree, by Hobbes.
Bentham provided thirteen ‘rules or canons’ for penal proportion.11 He did so with
the intention of ensuring, as John Rawls has said, that ‘the absolute level of penalties
will be as low as possible’.12 The result of Bentham’s analysis was an intricate model
calculating social pains against social pleasures, and aiming to provide graduations
from mild to more severe punishment for the purpose of deterrence. In other words,
his theory presents his penal sanction as an extension of, and in complete accord with,
a system of political economy envisaged as efficient in that it would only ever deliver
the minimum pain of punishment necessary to achieve reductions in offending
behaviour.
a) Precursors to a Consequentialist Theory of Proportion
Though Bentham judged his own work to be original in the provision of a coherent
structure for the assessment of quantities of pain as punishment he freely admitted
debts to a number of thinkers, with key figures as far as punishment is concerned
being Montesquieu,13 Beccaria and William Eden.14 Clearly aware of the novelty of
his own model, Bentham stated:
my fear is, that in the ensuing model, I may be thought to have
carried my endeavours at proportionality too far. Hitherto scarce any
attention has been paid to it. Montesquieu seems to have been almost
the first who has had the least idea of any such thing. In such a matter
11 Ibid., pp. 166-71.
12 J. Rawls, ‘Two Concepts of Rules’, The Philosophical Review, lxiv. (1955), 13 n.
13 Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, Les lettres persanes, Holland, 1721; and De l’esprit des lois,
in Oeuvres complètes, Paris, 1964. The translation used hereafter is A. Cohler, B. Miller, H. Stone, The
Spirit of the Laws, Cambridge, 1989.
14 William Eden, 1st Baron Auckland (1744-1814). He published Principles of Penal Law , London,
1771, held office as Under-Secretary of State for the Northern Department, 1772-8, and was MP for
New Woodstock 1774-84. Eden was raised to the peerage in 1793.
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therefore, excess seemed more eligible than defect. The difficulty is to
invent; that done, if any thing seems superfluous, it is easy to
retrench.15
Of course, examples of the advocacy of proportion in punishment can be found prior to
the eighteenth century. Even amongst classical thinkers, with Cicero for instance, the
notion of punishment being measured according to the extent of the offence is
considered.16 But of special interest to Bentham’s discussion is the emphasis on
consequential detail and here some valuable connections can be made with the work
of Thomas Hobbes.
In Leviathan there can be found principles of punishment not dissimilar to
those provided by Bentham’s later system. Hobbes suggested, for example, that
‘hurt inflicted, if less than the benefit of transgressing, is not punishment’. The clear
sense being that the weight of punishment must overcome any ‘benefit’ provided to
the offender by the offending act.17 Here was a concept closely corresponding with
Bentham’s core expression of the need to proportion the pain of punishment so that it
would ‘outweigh the profit’ of the offence. Also suggested in Hobbes was the idea that
any pain of punishment which did not reach this required ‘weight’ could not then be
called a punishment. In such a case, he said, the punishment rendered became only a
‘hurt inflicted’. Similarly, for Bentham, this would be described as pain ‘wasted’,
since it was incorrectly proportioned to the profit of the offence.18
Therefore, although we have Bentham’s statement indicating his belief that
Montesquieu was the originator of the emphasis on proportion, it is certain that
15 IPML (CW), p. 172 n. For Bentham’s mention of Montesquieu and Beccaria as precursors to his own
proportion theory, a paragraph from Bowring, i. p. 399, is generally offered. See Radzinowicz, English
Criminal Law, pp. 384-5; H. L. A. Hart, ‘Bentham’s Principle of Utility and Theory of Penal Law, an
interpretative essay’, IPML (CW), p. cv. Since Bowring took his text from Smith’s recension of Dumont’s
Théorie des peines, and it has yet to be established whether these are Bentham’s words, it seems better to
rely on Bentham’s own reference in IPML.
16 ‘Noxiae poena par esto’ (let the punishment be equal with the offence), Cicero, De Legibus, BK. III, Ch.
20.
17 For this and following references to Hobbes, see Leviathan, ed. M. Oakeshott, Oxford, 1955, ch. 28,
‘Of Punishments and Rewards’. Hobbes maintained here that the purpose of punishment was to deter
future offences.
18 Hobbes stressed the need to inflict only the punishment determined by law, and any ‘greater hurt’ was
deemed to be ‘not punishment, but an act of hostility’, Leviathan, p. 204. Thus, not only did he imply a type
of proportion, but he also provided a clear consequentialist justification for the infliction of punishment, by
saying that ‘no pain [ought to be] inflicted without respect to the future good’, Leviathan, p. 203. An
intention to make the delinquent and others obey the law in future was therefore a crucial condition for
Hobbes’s definition of punishment.
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‘proportion’ in punishment, in some sense, had a longer and more prominent
English lineage than is perhaps indicated by Bentham’s own references.19 The
nascent mechanistic view found in Hobbes suggested a use of penal proportion which
can easily be followed into Bentham’s work.20 And whilst Bentham never mentioned
Hobbes in his punishment writings,21 in the depiction of legal action as a force of
potential pain working against the opposite impelling forces of potential pleasure,
the same conclusion was reached by both thinkers - that a certain quantity of
punishment could be defined as both necessary and correct. The parallels with
Bentham’s theory are strong in that the idea of proportion is crucial to both
justifications of calibrated pain as ‘punishment’, and the argument was accordingly
directed towards an ‘economic’ discussion of quantities of pain rather than
concentrating on the more traditional debate regarding the appropriateness of specific
forms of punishment.22
Other thinkers also showed that proportionality was a subject discussed in
England before the works of Montesquieu or Beccaria rose to prominence. In a little
known work by Sollom Emlyn, for instance, the early advocacy of proportionality in
punishment is found.23 Yet Emlyn continued to make considerable use of religious
justifications, particularly for his ardent defence of the death penalty, and his
maintenance of connections between crime and sin revealed a continuing relationship
with contemporaries who stressed elements other than proportion. With this
connection with sin in mind (and Bentham’s desire to avoid the connection) it may
be supposed that the fact that Hobbes was similarly blunt in his conviction that ‘[...]
every crime is a sin’ may go some way towards explaining Bentham’s avoidance of
any reference to Hobbes despite their obvious connections.24
In comparison, Bentham’s discussion was sharply distinguished in its wholly secular
19 Beccaria also noted the pre-eminence of Montesquieu in this field, ‘The immortal President de Montesquieu
touched hastily on this matter. Indivisible truth has compelled me to follow the shining footsteps of this
great man’. See On Crimes and Punishments, p. 4.
20 See also Leviathan, p. 94, where Hobbes said, ‘Therefore before the names of just, and unjust can have
place, there must be some coercive power, to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants,
by the terror of some punishment, greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant.’
21 Hobbes is occasionally mentioned in Bentham’s letters. See, for example, The Correspondence of Jeremy
Bentham, vol. vii., ed. J.R. Dinwiddy, Oxford, 1998 (CW), pp. 25 and 136.
22 Bentham went even further by preferring the word ‘value’ to ‘quantity’ since, ‘the word quantity will
not properly include the circumstances either of certainty or proximity’. IPML (CW), p. 169.
23 Sollom Emlyn, State Trials, ‘Preface to the Second Edition of State Trials’, vol. i, (London, 1730). For
further discussion see J. Beattie, Crime and the Courts, Oxford, 1989, p. 453.
24 Leviathan, p. 190. Mandeville appears to be the first English advocate of a clear separation between crime
and sin.
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approach, already common amongst the progenitors of utilitarian thought. Men such
as Hutcheson and Helvétius provided a considerable impetus for penal thinking which
avoided any association with religious justification, and there can be little doubt that
they paved the way for Bentham’s extension of rational calculation and an ‘economic’
conceptualisation of offending behaviour.25
3. The Thirteen Rules of Proportion and the Production of Milder Punishment
The development of specific rules for the purpose of proportioning punishments to
offences is clearly Bentham’s most obvious contribution to proportion theory and the
devising of optimal policy in the response to crime. With nine of his rules he
established the foundations for increases in amounts of pain provided as
punishment.26 Three others protected against excesses, with rules five and six limiting
increases in pain, whilst rule twelve provided for a positive diminution. Finally, a
thirteenth rule was offered which stressed that precise calculation was not required and
small disproportions might be ignored. With this plan Bentham sought the formation of
a mechanism for a calibrated assessment and application of pain that was simply
unknown to earlier analyses.
The crux of the theory was an overwhelming emphasis placed on
quantities of pain: [...] the four first, we may perceive, serve to mark
out the limits on the side of diminution: the limits below which a
punishment ought not to be diminished: the fifth, the limits on the side
of increase: the limits above which it ought not to be increased.27
Not only was this fifth rule, which limited the increase, of profound importance in
Bentham’s scheme for the reduction of punishments as observed in contemporary
legal practice, but each of the first four rules added quantities of pain in such a way
as constantly to preserve their increase relative to the perceived increase in the
25 Francis Hutcheson maintained that ‘right’ action depended solely on material consequences, saying,
‘That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers: and that worst, which
in like manner, occasions misery’. See Inquiry Concerning Moral Good and Evil, 1726, pp. 177-7.
Helvétius asserted that all men are driven only by self-interest, and their despotic tendencies must be
checked by tangible motives: see De l’esprit, pp. 284-9.
26 See IPML (CW), Ch. 14, rules 1-4 and rules 7-11, pp. 166-171.
27 Ibid., p. 169.
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severity of the offence.28 Seeking such control in the infliction of pain revealed
Bentham to be on common ground with a prominent strain of contemporary English
reform thinking which can be seen represented in the use of Beccaria’s work by men
such as William Eden. Such writers were concerned with reducing the severity of
punishments as applied under contemporary practice. For Bentham, following his
economic model, more lenient punishment could only ever be expressed as a
reduction in the quantity of pain linked proportionately to a new, lower assessment
of the pain spread by the offence.29 Less pain could only be justified once his theory of
the distribution of pains had discovered the degree of harm done to be, in fact, lower
than that conventionally assumed.
There were thus several theorists at this period writing in favour of more
lenient systems of punshment and such thinkers were using a variety of theoretical
approaches. Beccaria’s and Eden’s pro-leniency theories may be seen as precursors
to Bentham, but only in terms of the attack on the destructive consequences of
contemporary severities and in locating Bentham’s relationship within the English
debate where common support could be found for proportioning.30 Bentham paid
considerable attention to Beccaria’s demands for milder punishments, although the
simple concept of proportionality presented in Beccaria’s vision of a fixed scale of
punishments to offences was not reflected in Bentham’s more variable
embodiment of proportionality within his thirteen rules. With Beccaria, as with Eden,
the basis for proportion was frequently sentimentalism - for Bentham this was an
example of the erroneous establishment of political argument on principles of
sympathy and antipathy. 31 In some respects, therefore, Bentham’s ‘economic’
28 One of the biggest criticisms of punishment was that the law provided no reasonable limits to its
infliction, beyond the protection provided by Article 10 of the 1689 Declaration of Rights against
excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishments. See L.G. Schwoerer, The Declaration of Rights,
1689, Baltimore, 1981, p. 86. Ignatieff has noted, however, that proportionality was exercised by victims,
jurors and judges regardless of the law: ‘obviously, a complex calculus ordered a prosecutor’s, judge’s, or
juryman’s conception of the proportionality of punishment to crime. We do not know enough about this
calculus to explain why it changed during the eighteenth century’. A Just Measure of Pain, New York,
1978, pp. 19-20. Bentham’s approach was closely connected with this popular desire for proportion.
29 Spread in primary and secondary degrees – see Cost-Benefit Table above.
30 For the English debate Francis Bacon was of great and continuing influence, not only for reform in
terms of a Digest, but also as a precursor to eighteenth-century attacks on severity. ‘For roughness, it is a
needless cause of discontent: severity breedeth fear, but roughness breedeth hate.’ See Francis Bacon, Essay
XI, ‘Of Great Place’, The Essays or Counsels Civil and Moral of Francis Bacon, ed. A. S. Gaye, Oxford, 1911,
p. 46. He was also popular across Europe. Indeed, Beccaria honoured him by placing a line from his essay
‘Of Negociating’ on the title page of On Crimes and Punishments.
31 See UC xvii. 48, ‘Antipathy on the side of lenity’. See also the first paragraph of UC xxvii. 60. Beccaria also
used utilitarian arguments which unquestionably redeemed his analysis in Bentham’s opinion.
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response can be seen as a direct reply to the inadequacy of existing theory provided
by prominent advocates of proportioned leniency.
Bentham was well aware of the potential charges against his system from such
supporters of sentimentalism. He might be accused, he suggested, of offering a system
fatally flawed on the grounds that the ignorant, or those roused by passion, did not
calculate. To this he provided an emphatic response:
When matters of such importance as pain and pleasure are at stake[...]
who is there that does not calculate? Men calculate, some with less
exactness, indeed, some with more: but all men calculate. I would not
say, that even a madman does not calculate. Passion calculates, more or
less, in every man: in different men, according to the warmth or
coolness of their dispositions: according to the firmness or irritability
of their minds: according to the nature of the motives by which they
are acted upon.32
And although in an early manuscript Bentham outlined a distinction which suggested
that poor men might be driven by ‘the physical appetite of hunger’ rather than by
‘the appetite for riches’, he still regarded such poor men as selecting courses of
action on the blunt basis of profit and loss, though he emphasised that they may be
‘less qualified for the task’.33 With such an understanding of the intrinsic nature of
calculative, rational motivation, a system which itself emphasised calculation was
not only suitable but, indeed, necessary. Consequently, Bentham formed a system
in which more moderate punishments were deemed necessary on the basis of an
application of logic rather than upon any sentimental or religious grounds. Appropriate
quantities of pain, delivered by various punishments, were sought via an empirical
assessment of the effectiveness of past punishments. The consequences of existing
punishments were searched for their proven deterrent value, and a sense of
mathematical precision was stressed throughout.34
32 IPML (CW), pp. 173-4. He added, as proof of the calculation of madmen, that, ‘There are few madmen but
what are observed to be afraid of the strait waistcoat’. Ibid., p. 174n.
33 UC xxvii. 63. See also the fuller extract given at p. 24 below. Bentham stressed that all men do not
calculate equally. The poorer men are, the more they are naturally driven by their physical appetites of lust
and hunger and the less effective they are at calculating.
34 See also UC xxvii. 24a, on calculation.
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a) Leniency as Bentham ‘s Fourth Objective of Punishment
At every point during his discussion of proportion Bentham kept his attention
on the prime goal of deterrence, as expressed in his objects of punishment, but here too
we find an important and insufficiently analysed element.35 The first three of his objects
have often been discussed in previous commentaries, and of greatest importance for
Bentham was the attempted prevention of all crimes - the first object of punishment.
He also made it clear, as his second object, that if an offence was to be committed
then the penal code must seek to prevent the worst; and thirdly, such a code ought to
dispose the offender to keep the mischief caused down to a minimum. But of particular
interest here is the fourth object of punishment, which stated that mischief must be
prevented ‘at the least expence’, and the influence of Beccaria is profound, as Becker
rightly noted.
Whilst it is possible to view this object in monetary terms, and this view is certainly
encouraged by Bentham’s use of the term ‘cheap’, it also provides a clear reference to
his broader economic model for crime prevention. In this respect ‘cheapness’ meant
nothing more than the ‘least quantity of pain’ possible, or in other words, as mild a
punishment as possible. Thus, whilst the first three objects of punishment concentrated
on prevention, his fourth object of punishment was leniency, assessed as minimum
pain or indisposition to severity. Leniency was, therefore, one of four key goals for
Bentham. And these four goals governed, collectively, the application of his rules of
proportion:
Subservient to these four objects, or purposes, must be the rules or
canons by which the proportion of punishments to offences is to be
governed.36
In accord with his objects, Bentham’s first four rules established additions in pain to
outweigh the profit of the offence, to move against the greatest offences, to
encourage preferment of the lesser of two competing offences, and to assign
additions of punishment for each particle of mischief found to have been spread.
Much can be related to Beccaria here, and Bentham specifically referred to Beccaria
35 IPML (CW), p. 165.
36 Ibid.
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when he stated his first rule of proportion.37 Although the equivalent expression of
punishment ‘outweighing’ the profit of the offence is not to be found in Beccaria’s
text, what is found is a justification of proportion expressed such that,
the obstacles that restrain men from committing crimes should be
stronger according to the degree that such misdeeds are contrary to the
public good and according to the motives which lead people to
crimes.38
Beccaria went on to offer a critique of notions of honour, vice and virtue as foundations
for punishment which changed through the ages, and he called for the establishment
of a ‘universal scale of punishments and crimes’. As Montesquieu had done earlier,
Beccaria suggested that the same punishment for crimes causing differing degrees of
harm was counter-productive.39
Bentham incorporated Beccaria’s notion of proportion succinctly in his first
rule that, ‘the value of the punishment must not be less in any case than what is
sufficient to outweigh that of the profit of the offence ’.40 ‘Profit’, of course, suggested
more than pecuniary gain, but referred once more to an encompassing conception of
pleasure, or advantage, derived by the offender from the offence. Similarly, Bentham
incorporated, in his second and third rules, the distinction between greater and lesser
crimes as first discussed by Montesquieu.
Where Bentham made substantial developments in the understanding of
proportion as a provider of leniency was with the fifth and sixth rules which, for the
first time, established a limit to increases in pain. Whilst it was vital, as the fourth
rule said, to ‘punish for each particle of the mischief’, the novel restraint on Bentham’s
infliction of pain was given by the emphasis in his fifth rule, that prevention be secured
with minimum pain. Thus, stressing the importance of his objective of leniency,
Bentham said:
37 See ibid., p. 166. Bentham referred to section six of Morellet’s 1766 French translation, Traité des délits et
des peines.
38 Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments, pp. 14-16. For Beccaria punishments were seen as ‘political
obstacles’.
39 Ibid., p. 16, ‘If an equal punishment is meted out to two crimes that offend society unequally,
then men find no stronger obstacle standing in the way of committing the more serious crime if it holds a
greater advantage for them’. Compare Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, bk. 6 ch. 16, pp. 91-2.
40 IPML (CW), p. 166.
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The last object is, whatever mischief is guarded against, to guard
against it at as cheap a rate as possible: therefore The punishment ought
in no case to be more than what is necessary to bring it into conformity
with the rules here given.41
With this fifth rule of proportion the justification for any excess or severity in
punishment was rejected.
Yet it was not only on rule five that the assessment of leniency within Bentham’s
theory depended. With the need to incorporate the essence of the more sentimental, or
‘humanitarian’, approaches of Beccaria and also, to some extent, that of Eden, Bentham
provided for the protection of individual sensibility and circumstance within his rules of
proportion. Thus, rule six stated:
That the quantity actually inflicted on each individual offender may
correspond to the quantity intended for similar offenders in general,
the several circumstances influencing sensibility ought always to be
taken into account.42
The centrality of circumstances and sensibility were vital to Bentham’s theory if he
was to achieve the same end as Beccaria of protecting the individual within a
logical system involving the assignment of pain. In practice Bentham indicated that
this must involve delegating a considerable sphere of action to the judge. For, whilst
his first five rules were intended to guide the legislator alone, with the sixth rule he
attempted, quite specifically, to guide the judge, ‘in his endeavours to conform, on
both sides, to the intentions of the legislator’.43 And the intentions of the legislator,
as prescribed within the first five rules, were to inflict the mildest possible
punishments which prevented mischief. Such concessions in favour of judicial
interpretation stood in stark contrast to Beccaria’s desire to avoid any leeway for
41 Ibid., p. 169. He emphasised the importance of the fifth rule later when discussing the properties to
be given to punishment, ‘the punishment ought in no case to be more than what is required by the several
other rules: since, if it be, all that is above that quantity is needless’. Ibid., p. 175.
42 Ibid., p. 169.
43 Ibid.
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judicial discretion.44 Yet Bentham’s inclusion of such discretion was essential to
achieve the necessary scope to establish an economic, ‘minimum’ punishment as the
standard.
b) The Calculation of Milder Punishment as an Aid to Deterrence
So far emphasis has been placed on the fourth object of delivering punishment at
as cheap a rate as possible. In this sense minimum punishment was a key goal.
However, this fourth object did not detract from, but supported, the first three
objects which together aimed for prevention.45 Once again, debts were incurred here
to both Beccaria and Eden. Beccaria, in particular, relied principally on arguments
concerning certainty to support his position, and to remove the need for pardons or
exemptions. So he wrote, ‘[...] one of the greatest checks on crime is not the cruelty of
punishments, but their inevitability’.46 Importance was clearly placed on the sureness
of the infliction of punishment on the guilty. William Eden argued similarly, but
added that mildness in punishing protected the public virtue of all - victims,
witnesses, juries and judges.47 This emphasis on mildness was a development from the
notion prominent in Montesquieu and Beccaria that harsh punishments corrupted the
citizenry, and that once a citizen body was accustomed to severe punishments such
severity no longer shocked them into obedience of the law.48 The most damaging
criticism of the deterrent power of severe punishment was provided by Beccaria
when he noted how extremely difficult it was to maintain ‘the essential proportion’
between offences and punishments when severity was high, and that impunity arose
from the very savagery of severe punishments.49
Thus, ‘economical’ or mild punishments aided deterrence via their conduciveness
to proportioning, and by their ease and certainty of application. The scope for
graduated proportionality within Bentham’s theory has been shown above to have
44 See Beccaria, Crimes and Punishment , chapter 4, ‘Interpretation Of The Law’, where he reacted
vehemently against the extreme judicial discretion characteristic of the Europe of his day. Such discretion
was the product of the simultaneous operation of Roman law, local custom, royal decrees and judicial
practice.
45 It supported them only in the sense of emphasising the minimum necessary deterrent.
46 Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments, p. 46.
47 In that under severe regimes ‘jurors are taught to trifle with their oaths’, and to lie by ‘a kind of pious
perjury’, in order to protect minor offenders from grossly disproportionate penalties. Such behaviour was
due, Eden said, to impulses of benevolence. With mild punishments there was no need for deceit, hence no-
one was corrupted by the judicial process. Principles of Penal Law, pp. 268-70.
48 Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments, pp. 46-7.
49 Ibid., p. 46.
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been considerable through his emphasis on calculative quantification; and although
Bentham did not demand the removal of judicial freedoms, he clearly expected
punishment always to be applied.50 Judges were not free to recommend pardons. With
Bentham, they simply had discretion to adjust the quantities of pain applied; yet this
discretion was intended to allow better proportioning of punishment to offence, and
hence improve the quality of the punishment as a deterrent for others. His objective
of graduated, minimum pain therefore allowed, first, no reason for the restraint of
prosecution on the part of both victim and jury, and second, the certain application
of punishment, on the part of the judge.
The superiority of Bentham’s system in its deterrent effectiveness relied
completely on the accuracy of its calculative analysis of the quantity of punishment
relative to the offence. As a standard rule Bentham held with the general dictum that
‘the quantum of the punishment must rise with the profit of the offence’.51 However,
determining the profit of the offence was by no means straightforward although,
‘the profit of the offence is commonly more certain than the punishment’.52 To
compensate for this accepted, but awkward fact, Bentham introduced three further
rules within his theory of proportion which enabled additions to be made to the
quantity of punishment:53
[Rule 7] To enable the value of punishment to outweigh that of the
profit of the offence, it must be increased, in point of magnitude, in
proportion as it falls short in point of certainty.
[Rule 8] Punishment must be further increased in point of magnitude,
in proportion as it falls short in point of proximity.
[Rule 9] Where the act is conclusively indicative of a habit, such an
encrease must be given to the punishment as may enable it to
outweigh the profit not only of the individual offence, but of such
other like offences as are likely to have been committed with impunity
by the same offender.
50 To be applied, that is, where justification existed, i.e. not where the conditions for ‘Cases unmeet for
punishment’ applied.
51 IPML (CW), p. 167.
52 Ibid., p. 169.
53 Rules 7, 8 & 9. Ibid., p. 170.
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With these supplements to his first rule of proportion we find Bentham developing
precise guidelines for an improved correlation between the values of both
punishment and offence. In attempting to account for any mischief caused, and profit
provided, by other likely offences of the same type, and in assessing whether an
offence was indicative of a habit, Bentham substantially modified consequentialist
proportion theory by extending his assessment beyond any single offence.
Yet these three further rules look as if it they could easily tend towards
gratuitous harshness; indeed, Bentham himself suggested that it may well be a
‘severe’ and ‘random’ way of calculating.54 And although Bentham emphasised that
the rules might only be used in certain cases, such as frauds of coin, where similar
offences were almost guaranteed to have occurred without detection, one is still left
with the sense that the allowance of a greater quantity of pain, than was known for
certain to be justified, did provide grounds for excessively severe pain. This sense
is only increased by rules ten and eleven which stated that if a quality, or mode, of
punishment is especially appropriate, and particularly if this is well calculated to provide
a ‘moral lesson’, then quantity could again be increased.55 Accordingly, his closely
calculative theory of proportion seems undermined, and with it any pursuit of
leniency. However, in the manuscripts, Bentham can be found to suggest that:
If the rules of evidence be clear from over-scrupulous subtleties, if the
system of procedure be simple, and the administration of Justice pure, a
small quantity of punishment is enough to make up that deficiency of
force which results from the uncertainty of execution.56
The point to note is that only a small quantity of additional pain was envisaged within
the supplements to punishment provided by rules seven, eight and nine above. The
implication is, that the additions from these rules, for unknown elements in the
calculation of punishment, are to be substantially less than the quantities of pain
justified by the first and most important rule.
Yet, though the manuscript in question gives some clarification on this issue of
supplementary pains, it raises new problems not treated in IPML. Whilst it seems to
54 Ibid. This suggestion provided material for those who suggested that Bentham continued to favour severe
punishments: see Radzinowicz, English Criminal Law, p. 391.
55 Here Bentham seems to revert to giving undue weight to the manner of the offence, rather than the
manner of the motives.
56 UC xxvii. 63. Sheet headed ‘Common Measure’, uncertainly dated, but probably 1777.
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be the case, in theory, that Bentham argued for only small quantities of punishment to be
needed to achieve a deterrent effect, in practice it was shown to be more complicated.
An important distinction is introduced with the claim that there is a significant
difference in deterrent effect of a given lot of punishment when faced with various
motives to offend.
It is clear that in Bentham’s early penal theory a particular amount, or mode, of
punishment had a better chance of deterring when it operated against what he
described as the appetitive motive of ‘amour’ or ‘affection’, rather than when
confronted with, say, a motive of physical desire or ill-will. Thus he remarks:
There are some appetites which are circumspect and reflective;
such are the appetites for riches for power, and for honour. There are
others which are precipitate and blind, such are the physical appetites
(of lust and hunger) and the appetite of revenge. The former can be
combated with much more advantage than the latter: with much
greater probability of success [...]
The poorer a man is, the nearer is the appetite for riches to the
physical appetite of hunger: it is the more precipitate: it is the less
qualified for the task of calculation. On this account it is necessary to
be severer against crimes of indigence than against crimes of avarice
although the nominal profit to the criminal and the mischief to the
party injured be to the same amount in the one case as in the other.57
The implications of this passage appear far-reaching. What is of interest here is the
considerable emphasis placed on the principle that quantities of punishment restrain
motives, rather than prevent specific offences. The countering of various motivating
forces, on the economic model, was given new importance in this calculation of
punishment. 58 But recognition was also given, for the first time, to the entirely
inconsistent deterrent ability of a given quantity of punishment when faced with a
57 UC xxvii. 63.
58 This was a considerable distance from Beccaria’s understanding, which suggested a fixed scale of
punishment to offence and appeared unable substantially to accord with motivating circumstances in
particular instances. Eden, on the other hand, did appreciate something of the variety of forms of motivation,
since he called for the legislator to put himself in the situation of the offender, and to take account of the
offender’s circumstances before assigning punishment. Yet he could only offer vague, incalculable
sympathy in response.
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variety of motivating ‘appetites’.
This appreciation of the varied effects of a given lot of punishment on distinct
motives produced a number of difficulties for Bentham. By linking economic
weakness, i.e. poverty, with essentially ‘precipitate’ motives to offend, Bentham
assumed that the poor must be driven by stronger motives, and hence would require
a greater threat of punishment to prevent them from offending. So he envisaged a
situation where the same offence might be committed simultaneously by an indigent
poor man and by a middle-class man, and where they might both receive the same
quantity of profit of pleasure. However, not only would they require different quantities
of punishment, but, as the quote above emphasised, the indigent man ought generally
always to receive the more severe. As the quantity of punishment had to rise with the
profit of the offence, so it must also apparently rise with the involvement of
‘precipitative’ physical appetites.
This concept holds damaging implications for the presentation of Bentham’s
theory as one which supports leniency. Since the most prosecuted group of individuals,
the poor, are hereby prescribed greater quantities of pain than their better-off
compatriots, it appears that the continued concentration of severity upon the most
disadvantaged sections of society is not only countenanced but justified. And
although Bentham’s twelfth rule of proportion operates to reduce quantities of pain,
by allowing for circumstances to prove punishment for any crime to be unprofitable,
the weight given to the physical, ‘precipitate’ motives of hunger and lust apparently
removes all hope of any general leniency for the poor within his penal model.
However, Bentham spent much time considering motivation, both in
psychological and economic terms, and it is clear from the structure of his theory, as
presented in IPML, that many ideas and positions were well established before he
came to consider the application of his rules of proportion. Of particular importance
was the chapter on dispositions, for it was on the basis of this element only, that
motives otherwise requiring severe pain for their restraint might be said to be deterred
by a lesser.59
Thus, when considering in what proportion an offence was to be punished,
Bentham took the following three aspects into account, and apparently in the
following order:
59 See Ch. 11 in IPML (CW).
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1. the quantity of pain inflicted on society by the offence
2. the quantity of profit received by the offender
3. the disposition of the offender
It can be seen that his thirteen formal rules of proportion dealt essentially with the
second aspect in that their prime object was to outweigh the profit of the offence
at minimum expense; they also dealt with the first aspect by emphasising that every
particle of mischief must receive a quantity of punishment. These thirteen rules did
not, however, bear any relation to the third aspect, that of the disposition of the
offender. Yet, his theory of proportion had also to incorporate increments of pain
relative to the nature of the offender’s disposition if this was found to be ‘bad’. Here we
find a conceptual separation between motivation, intention, disposition and the rules of
proportion, with ‘disposition’, in particular, referring to a manner of reaction to motives.
The notion of disposition thus becomes closely linked to the idea of individual ‘character’
and its goodness or badness as reflected in, and identified by, the response to the force
of motives and their restraining sanctions. If ‘disposition’ was found to be other than
positively ‘bad’ then this aspect would provide grounds for restraint in punishment.
It is suggested therefore, that it was emphasis on this element which prevented
Bentham’s logical addition of quantities of punishment from uncontrollably
undermining his interest in greater leniency, especially for the indigent poor.
4. The Role of ‘Disposition’ in the Reduction of Legal Punishment
As an integral part of Bentham’s discussion of human dispositions he confronted the
problem of how to assess the depravity of an offender, and how to account for this
‘anti-social’ aspect of character within his economic model. In the late eighteenth-
century debate this question of depravity revolved around, and was inextricably linked
with, the question of how temptation should be dealt with in any theory of
proportioned punishment.60
The problem of a reduction in blame when accompanied by an increase in
temptation was a peculiarly English development. It was not prominent in
Beccaria’s discussion, yet William Blackstone, an important disciple of Beccaria in
60 Blackstone sought increases in punishment for increases in temptation. Eden, on the other hand, sought
proportionate reductions in punishment in relation to increases in temptation.
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some respects, spent much time considering the question. And William Eden, once
again, is seen to confront the problem of temptation in suggesting that the
‘malignity’ of an offence should be established before assigning punishment.61
Eden’s analysis has further been contrasted with the approaches of Blackstone and
William Paley, both of whom sought in varying ways to justify severe punishments,
as they too drew conclusions of depravity from the susceptibility to temptation.62
However, both Blackstone and Paley argued that the category of offence took
precedence over the motives of the offender, and over the consequences of his actions.
Hence the most tempting offences, that is to say, those which were most easily
committed and most difficult to detect, ought to be assigned the severest punishments.
Eden’s analysis was, conversely, exceptional in its valuation of the particular
circumstances of individual offenders, and in its demand for a clear reduction in
punishment in proportion to any increases in temptation, and there are clear
connections to Bentham’s thinking here.63
Bentham unmistakably engaged with this debate when he assumed
‘disposition’ to be associated with the question of temptation.64 Incorporating this
into his model he regarded a disposition to be either beneficent or depraved, and his
position of the late 1770s was summed up in IPML as follows:
So far then as the absence of any aggravation, arising from extraordinary
depravity of disposition, may operate, or at the utmost, so far as the
presence of a ground of extenuation, resulting from the innocence or
beneficence of the offender’s disposition, can operate, the strength of
the temptation may operate in abatement of the demand for
punishment. But it can never operate so far as to indicate the propriety
of making the punishment ineffectual, which it is sure to be when
61 Eden, Principles of Penal Law, p. 10.
62 Radzinowicz is one amongst many to have noted the variety of views on punishment in relation to an
increased temptation to offend. English Criminal Law, p. 250 and p. 385.
63 Eden’s argument was that tempting crimes showed less depravity, and consequently deserved
less punishment. It was Eden’s view - against the accepted understanding of the law as expressed by
William Blackstone - that the application of Beccaria’s theory of proportion in punishment could provide
for no other conclusion. It was inherently unjust to punish more severely those who committed the
simplest and most tempting crimes.
64 This can be seen in a number of texts. See IPML (CW), Ch. 11, and p. 138 in particular, where Bentham
discussed, ‘what is to be understood by the strength of the temptation, and what indication it may give of
the degree of mischievousness in a man’s disposition in the case of any offence’.
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brought below the level of the apparent profit of the offence.65
Here, Bentham clearly stated his rejection of Blackstone’s and Paley’s calls for
automatic increases in punishment with increases in temptation; and in this sense
Bentham can be said to follow Eden’s line of thinking, though with an economic
justification attached to any reduction of punishment in relation to temptation.
Nevertheless, Bentham placed a strict limit on the extent to which temptation could
be used to reduce punishment - it ought never to fall ‘below the level of the apparent
profit of the offence’. Here we see that although disposition must be taken into
account, it was not of prime importance; it must follow a calculation of mischief
spread, and a valuation of the profit of the offence. Nonetheless, a basis was
provided for the reduction in punishment.
However, paradoxically, the above text, which supported the strength of
temptation as a ground of abatement, apparently contradicted the analysis given just
one sentence earlier:
The strength of the temptation, cæteris paribus, is as the profit of the
offence: the quantum of the punishment must rise with the profit of the
offence: cæteris paribus, it must therefore rise with the strength of the
temptation. This there is no disputing.66
Clearly there is ample room for confusion. Bentham’s position in regard to this issue
has been closely discussed by both Elie Halévy and Leon Radzinowicz; but although
they ultimately conclude that Bentham’s theory does allow for some, limited
extenuation of punishment upon certain occasions of increased temptation, they remain
unconvinced that Bentham sought any substantial reduction on these grounds. 67
Radzinowicz, for instance, has taken Bentham’s position to mean that:
penalties should be adjusted to every degree of temptation, but the
courts should have the power to mitigate them in cases where the
presence of temptation indicates the absence of a confirmed depravity,
65 IPML (CW), p. 167.
66 Ibid.
67 They also remain uncertain as to how to specify exactly which occasions may qualify for mitigated
punishment.
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or where the offence has been committed under the influence of a
benevolent stimulus.68
In other words he sees Bentham’s argument as being in favour of reducing
punishments. Elie Halévy, however, reflecting the quote from IPML above, begins
his analysis by saying that Bentham thought, ‘punishment must increase with the
profit from the crime; therefore, other things being equal, it should increase, [...] with
the strength of the temptation.’69 Halévy acknowledges the fact that Bentham knew
this appeared harsh and he sees that Bentham made an allowance for the element of
temptation, ‘so as to lessen the punishment in so far as the stronger influence of a
slight temptation indicates a worse disposition in the agent.’ 70 But Halévy
emphasises that this is to be seen as an exception, and must not be ‘confused with the
rule’. He continues:
To say that the proof of a depraved disposition is less conclusive is not to
say that the depravity is less. For in spite of contrary indications it is
always possible that the crime would have been committed even if the
temptation had been less strong. The attenuating circumstance is only a
matter of presumption; the crime is a matter of certainty.71
It seems Halévy is suggesting that it will be a rare occasion when an increase in
temptation will actually lead to any attenuation of punishment. It does sometimes
appear possible to doubt whether Bentham’s theory will actually lead to any
mitigation at all. In summing up the use of his chapter on human disposition, for
instance, Bentham said:
The depravity of disposition, indicated by an act, is a material
consideration in several respects. Any mark of extraordinary depravity,
by adding to the terror already inspired by the crime, and by holding up
the offender as a person from whom there may be more mischief to be
68 Radzinowicz, English Criminal Law , p. 385.
69 Halévy, Philosophic Radicalism, p. 69. Compare IPML (CW), p. 167.
70 Halévy, Philosophic Radicalism, p. 69.
71 Ibid.
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apprehended in future, adds in that way to the demand for punishment.72
This implies that any indications of extra depravity should produce an addition to the
quantity of punishment, which is something very different from looking for ways
of reducing punishment. It does not seem difficult to extend this calculation of
depravity, especially if deemed to be an ‘extraordinary depravity’ as above, to conclude
that the least likely effect of assessing disposition in Bentham’s terms would be any
reduction in punishment applied.
Similarly, Radzinowicz has also argued, despite his earlier comments given
above, that Bentham was in accord with Blackstone in supporting the punishing of the
most tempting crimes more severely so that the principal goal of deterrence be
achieved. He says, that Bentham, ‘suggests that punishment should be increased in
proportion to the temptation, irrespective of the gravity of the offence’.73 Clearly there
has been great uncertainty amongst commentators regarding Bentham’s precise
meaning.74 Radzinowicz tried to clear the confusion by sharply stating that what it
all indicates is that Bentham was, ‘by no means in favour of lenient penalties’.75 Both
commentators agree that there is a theoretical basis for the mitigation of punishment on
the basis of increased temptation, but it is reckoned, in practice, to be more an
exception rather than a rule, and an exception to be governed only by judicial discretion.
It is certain, at least, that it would be claiming too much to say that Bentham was
against lenient sentences. He clearly states that deliberately mild punishments were
72 IPML (CW), p. 141.
73 Radzinowicz, English Criminal Law, p. 391. Radzinowicz had also earlier said, ‘When, owing to a
combination of circumstances, the temptation to commit a certain crime is particularly great, the punishment
should be correspondingly more severe’: ibid., p. 384. And, likewise, he notes Bentham’s comment in
IPML that, ‘To say, then, as authors of great merit and great name [Beccaria and Eden] have said, that the
punishment ought not to increase with the strength of the temptation, is as much as to say in mechanics,
that the moving force or momentum of the power need not increase in proportion to the momentum of the
burthen’: see IPML (CW), p. 166n. Radzinowicz continues, ‘Paley and Blackstone both considered
increased temptation a reason for enhancing the severity of the punishment. Eden objected both to an
increase and a mitigation’. See English Criminal Law, p. 384. This, however, seems wrong since Eden
objected only to an increase.
74 Hart also finds Bentham’s views on temptation to be apparently contradictory: ‘For Bentham a strong
temptation points in two opposite directions: on the one hand it shows that the offence manifests a less
generally maleficent disposition needing less to correct it than the same offence committed for some trivial
gain. So punishment may in principle be abated on this account. But it must never be lowered to the point
at which it fails to outweigh the apparent profit; if it does the offender will be punished to no purpose and
his punishment will be so much useless cruelty[...]’. See H. L. A. Hart, ‘Bentham’s Principle of Utility and
Theory of Penal Law’, an interpretative essay, IPML, (1996), pp. cv-cvi.
75 Radzinowicz, English Criminal law, p. 391.
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cruel to both offender and the public at large:76
The partial benevolence which should prevail for the reduction of it
below this level, would counteract as well those purposes which such a
motive would actually have in view, as those more extensive purposes
which benevolence ought to have in view; it would be cruelty not only
to the public, but to the very persons in whose behalf it pleads [...]
Cruelty to the public [...] by suffering them, for want of adequate
protection, to lie exposed to the mischief of the offence: cruelty even to
the offender himself, by punishing him to no purpose.77
However, believing it cruel to be positively mild is not at all the same thing as being
outrightly opposed to milder punishments. From his economic perspective his only
prerequisite was that the minimum pain of the punishment must outweigh the profit of
the offence. And he defended this position against those who regarded this a harsh
tenet, saying, ‘the above rule has been often objected to, on account of its seeming
harshness: but this can only have happened for want of its being properly
understood’.78 On the question of quantities of pain in general he said quite simply in
the Traités:
The question is not whether a penal code is more or less severe; this is a
bad way of looking at the subject. The whole question can be reduced
to judging whether or not the severity of the code is necessary.79
It is more appropriate to say, then, that Bentham did not agree with Eden in supporting
lenient sentences simply because they were lenient, but that he did agree with Eden in
regarding existing systems of punishments to be inhumane in their lack of proportion;
consequently he sought to establish a far closer proportioning of punishment to
76 In his discussion of human dispositions Bentham concluded that: ‘[...] the aversion we find so frequently
expressed against the maxim, that the punishment must rise with the strength of the temptation; a maxim, the
contrary of which, as we shall see, would be as cruel to offenders themselves, as it would be subversive of
the purposes of punishment’. IPML (CW), p. 142.
77 Ibid., pp. 167-8.
78 Ibid., p. 167.
79 ‘Rationale’, Bowring, i. p. 398.
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offence.80
Ultimately then, Radzinowicz is mistaken in grouping Bentham together with
Blackstone simply because they both mention that punishment ought to be greater for
more tempting crimes. Bentham did not argue, as Blackstone and others did, that
tempting crimes demanded greater punishments because they were easy to commit.
Neither did he say that the most tempting crimes should be severely punished because
they were more difficult to prevent. His argument for all crimes was the same. They
will only be prevented once the pain of punishment outweighed the profit of the
offence. He took the view that neither too great nor too small a punishment was
required, but only one correctly measured.
To move the debate beyond the analysis of Halévy and Radzinowicz it is
necessary to return to the manuscripts.81 Here Bentham expressed the desire that
those of good disposition ought not to be punished more severely solely because they
were exposed to temptation. In the sense that ‘beneficence’ might be seen as a
characteristic of individual disposition, Bentham’s use of the concept of ‘good’
disposition here appears very close to the conventional notion of individual virtue.82
Indeed, where Eden spoke of virtue, Bentham suggested beneficial conduct. 83
Disposition is thus linked closely to intentionality. Yet still this was pursued in
economic terms: if an individual’s actions had no intention of harming society, or if
they positively meant to benefit society, then, although harm might be unwittingly
produced, the disposition had to be good or ‘beneficent’. Although such actions could not
be encouraged, at the very least they could be taken to show the absence of any
future threat from the offender.
The Nature of Disposition as an Indicator of Future Mischief
This future threat was of key importance for Bentham’s theory. To make sense of his
analysis we must examine the model of the ‘shapes of mischief’ discussed in the
chapter on the ‘Consequences of a Mischievous Act’ in IPML. 84 Using his
80 As Halévy rightly says, ‘It is true that Bentham happens to find himself in agreement[...] with the
sentimentalists when he denounces the excessive severity of punishments. But an agreement about
principles must not be inferred from a partial agreement about conclusions’. Philosophic Radicalism, p. 74.
81 And to UC xxvii. 60-3 in particular.
82 On the connection between good disposition and beneficence see Bentham’s quote at page 29 above.
83 See the discussion of disposition at IPML (CW), p. 167.
84 For a fuller account see A. J. Draper, ‘“To Exclude Some Greater Evil”: Distributions of Pain in
Bentham’s Theory of Punishment’, Contemporary Political Studies, 1998 , ed. A. Dobson and J.
Stanyer, Nottingham, 1998, pp. 269-78.
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understanding of the ‘danger’ of future pain, Bentham reassessed disposition, in cases
of high temptation, in terms of its indication of a potential future threat to the
community. Bentham established that a divided assessment of the future threat must be
made when seeking grounds for a reduction in the levels of punishment. Thus we find
in the manuscripts a distinction between a ‘general’ and a ‘particular’ future threat. Of
the individual offender of ‘less bad’ disposition Bentham believed it could be said that:
It is certain also that as far as he alone is concerned there is the less
reason, even on the principle of utility for punishing him: for there is
the less reason to apprehend that in his disposition the selfish or
dissocial affection will in the general tenor of his conduct maintain an
undue ascendance over the social [...] Now in proportion as the
temptation is strong, the less depraved is it necessary a man’s
disposition should be in order to admit of his yielding to the temptation
[...] in proportion therefore as the temptation is strong, the less has the
community to fear from the general behaviour of the delinquent,
abstracted from his behaviour in the particular sort of case in question.85
With high temptation indicative of less depraved disposition, society had less to fear
from the general behaviour of an individual. Hence Bentham could support the
argument of theorists such as Eden who believed that high temptation demanded more
lenient punishment. Thus Bentham gave the following example:
A man with a numerous family of children, on the point of starving,
goes into a baker’s shop, steals a loaf, divides it all among the children,
reserving none of it for himself. It will be hard to infer that that man’s
disposition is a mischievous one upon the whole.86
In general it could be said that such a man would only give in to the temptation
to steal when his family was on the point of starvation, and this was done in an extra-
regarding manner, i.e. he ate none of the stolen bread himself. Bentham’s model
assessed this act to be of little threat to society and a reduction in punishment could
85 See UC xxvii. 60.
86 IPML (CW), p. 128.
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be justified. To emphasise the point Bentham gave a further example:
Alter the case, give him [the man with the family] but one child, and
that hungry perhaps, but in no imminent danger of starving: and now let
the man set fire to a house full of people, for the sake of stealing money
out of it to buy the bread with. The disposition here indicated will
hardly be looked upon as a good one.87
Clearly, in this case, the temptation is in no way as extreme as the first, and the
action taken is directly harmful to others in a considerable degree. The general threat
from an individual prepared to take such action was considered to be high, and a
correspondingly high threat of punishment was required to counter such an offence.
But it was also established that, as far as the particular behaviour of both
offenders in the examples were concerned, they were extremely likely, perhaps even
certain, to succumb to future temptations similar to the ‘particular sort of case in
question’. The crucial importance of this point was carried to a logical conclusion
with the suggestion that ‘as often as a temptation of the magnitude in question falls in
his way, so often will he committ the offence in question’. Hence Bentham also claimed
that:
If then it be seriously intended to find a stop to the offence in question
it is evident that an addition must be made to the punishment; and that not
in the inverse proportion to the strength of the temptation.88
Bentham continued, saying that to do otherwise would be cruelty to both the
community and to the offender, thus, apparently neutralising once again his earlier
argument that temptation recommended abatement of punishment.
This divided approach to the assessment of offences of strong temptation
exemplifies the way Bentham’s theory was able to tackle existing questions in a new
fashion. But it also shows how the complexity introduced by such an appreciation of
positive and negative social value necessarily removed the possibility of establishing
any simple line of argument in respect of temptation. He could never provide a fixed
87 Ibid., pp. 128-9.
88 UC xxvii. 60.
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rule which demanded either an increase or a reduction when faced with high
temptation. Commentators have clearly had difficulty in reconciling the conflicting
ideas Bentham presented on this point. Yet consistency is provided in both his
manuscripts and published work.
On the one hand, from the ‘general’ perspective Bentham argued that society
had little to fear from the individual who succumbed to an offence of high temptation.
On the other hand, from the ‘particular’ view, he was certain that society had a great
deal to fear from the same offender. By dividing his analysis, and producing such a
dual assessment of the future threat from offenders lured by high temptation, Bentham
found grounds for supporting both a reduction and an increase in any corresponding
punishment. This does not imply, however, that one cancels out the other, for the
quantities involved always vary.
The problem for Bentham was that as long as there remained the chance of a
similar temptation reoccurring, the political sanction had to take some action to
prevent it. It was certainly not free to remit punishment altogether as he believed
was the case as far as the moral sanction was concerned.89 Again Bentham was in
accord with William Eden, for even Eden never suggested that offences of high
temptation ought to go unpunished altogether. With division into a ‘general’ and
‘particular’ threat, it seems plain that Bentham’s theory was able to establish a
considerably reduced threat from such offences. For, since the greater threat must
come from ‘general’ behaviour, once this was detached from the specific
‘particular’ threat, it was indeed possible for Bentham to argue for the imposition of a
lower quantity of pain as punishment.90 The obvious problem for Halévy and
Radzinowicz, in deciding which occasions were appropriate for mitigated punishment
and which were not, is resolved. In Bentham’s penal theory any mitigation on the
basis of temptation depended solely on the establishment of an absence of any
‘general’ threat from the behaviour of the offender, and this rested, predominantly, on
an identification of the ‘disposition’ of the offender as ‘good or beneficent’.
Thus, individual disposition was assessed by Bentham in terms of its inclination
to produce future pain within society, and therefore formed the last of the three key
aspects in Bentham’s theory of proportion. With his rules of proportion he provided a
89 See UC xxvii. 60, where a sharp contrast is drawn between the moral and political sanctions in cases
of high temptation.
90 Ibid.
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calculative model which sought restraint in punishment, and he attempted to
provide a method, framed in economic language, for justifying the milder
punishment of those driven to crime by circumstances where no positive indication
of depravity was found. In this way Bentham established a means for valuing the
popular, often sentimentally provoked, call for a reduction in severity of punishment
for simple, tempting crimes, and developed a detailed analysis for the calculation of
depravity.
Concluding Remarks
Becker was very much aware, in 1968, that an ‘economic’ approach to crime and
punishment might prove distasteful to his readers, and he sought to calm any
concerns provoked by the ‘apparent novelty of an “economic” framework for
illegal behaviour’ by making clear that both Beccaria and Bentham had ‘explicity
applied an economic calculus’ to these subjects some two hundred years earlier.91
This essay has attempted to illustrate how the intellectual heritage for an ‘economic’
perspective on crime and punishment is far richer than even Becker supposed, and
that with Bentham’s analysis it reached a new level of sophistication and
development.
Economic assessments form the root of consequentialist thinking about all
social policy and this discussion has sought to identify how comprehensive such
thinking can be when focussed on a particular issue. Bentham developed a subtle and
sophisticated method for the assessment and application of punishment in terms of
benefits and burdens. He was perfectly aware that the precision demanded by such a
theory could never be achieved in practice. Indeed, any theory which attempted to
account for quantities of pain inflicted on a population at large, made up of
‘unassignable’, that is entirely unknown, individuals could never achieve total
precision in quantification. Yet Bentham realised an assessment of such distributed
pains had to be attempted if an effective system of deterrence was to be achieved by
the imposition of legal punishment.
Becker’s own analysis has certainly raised an awareness of the ideas of
Bentham and Beccaria amongst contemporary eonomists, and Becker’s mathematical
91 Becker, ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’, p. 209.
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skills and novel applications enabled him to unlock some of the conceptions grasped
at by Bentham. Yet, in terms of the value of crime for criminals, and the coherence
of an ‘economy’ of deterrent threat from legal punishment, more remains to be done
and further exploration of Bentham’s economic model of analysis is undoubtedly
necessary if the full implications of his ‘pioneering studies’ are to be recognized. 92
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